Your agents act on their own. Who signed off on that?
An agent holds credentials, calls tools, reads documents and takes actions — without a person in the loop and without a person accountable. We make that surface reviewable, restrictable and provable.
Sound familiar?
- Agent credentials were created once, shared broadly, and never rotated or revoked.
- Nobody can say which tools an agent may call, with what scope, or with what spending limit.
- MCP servers are wired into production with default trust and no isolation.
- Attacks arrive through retrieved documents and tool outputs, not through the chat box.
- When an agent does something wrong, there is no trail that explains why it did it.
What we do
Agent inventory & threat model
Every agent, every credential, every tool it can reach — mapped against what it could do on a bad day.
Identity & permission redesign
Per-agent identities with owners, lifecycles and least-privilege scopes instead of one shared god-token.
Injection resistance
Hardening against indirect prompt injection through documents, tool responses and third-party content.
Traceability & gates
Audit trails, approval gates and human-in-the-loop checkpoints that satisfy both your CISO and the EU AI Act.
Go deeper
Non-Human Identities
Agents hold credentials with no onboarding, no offboarding, and nobody accountable
Tool Permissions & Least Privilege
Which agent may issue which call, at which scope, under which limit
MCP Server Security
Securing Model Context Protocol servers — the least covered surface in DACH
Indirect Prompt Injection
The attack arrives through tool outputs and documents, not through user input
Audit Trail & Approval Gates
Traceability, approval gates, and human-in-the-loop your auditors accept
Questions we get
How is this different from a Vibe Coding Audit?
The audit reviews the code your team wrote or prompted. Agent Security reviews what the running agent is allowed to do — identities, permissions, tool access and traceability.
We only use one agent framework. Is that enough scope?
Yes. Most damage comes from a single over-permissioned agent, not from the number of frameworks in use.
Do you also implement the fixes?
We can. Some teams take the findings and execute themselves, others want us to build the guardrails with them.
Tell us what's running in production.
We'll tell you what we'd check first — and what we wouldn't bother with.
Book a call